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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
was established to protect investors and support fair and efficient
financial markets. 1 The SEC strives to deliver this protection through the
enactment of laws and regulations. 2 These laws and regulations seek to
provide investors access to basic information about investments. 3 To
provide transparency, the SEC mandates public companies disclose
certain relevant financial and non-financial information to the public. 4
The SEC, as the primary regulator of the securities market, brings civil
actions against individuals who do not abide by the SEC Rules as well as
works with the federal government in prosecuting criminal trials.5
In 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was established
to support the SEC’s mission of protecting investors. 6 To combat bribery
of foreign officials in the practice of business, the FCPA enacted Section
13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Section 13(b)). 7
* Danielle Shaffer graduates in May 2017 with a Juris Doctorate and Master of Taxation from The
University of Akron School of Law. Danielle holds both a BSA in Accounting and a BBA in
Human Resource Management from The University of Akron. Danielle has passed all four parts of
the Uniform Certified Public Accountant Exam and will begin in the Tax Services Practice of Ernst
& Young LLP upon graduation.
1. See generally The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N.,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2015) (stating the mission of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Committee).
2. See generally id. (stating the purpose of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Committee).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See generally Pub. L. No. 95-213, Sections 101-204 (91. Stat. 1494) (codified as 15
U.S.C. Sections 78dd-1 to -3).
7. See id. (enhancing the 1934 Securities Exchange Act with additional provisions in
reaction to extensive bribery of foreign officials).
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Generally, Section 13(b) establishes requirements for the financial
records, internal controls, and accounting of public companies. 8 Section
13(b) maintains stricter requirements for financial records to allow the
public and SEC to easily detect illegal activity as well as to deter the
companies from participating in these activities. 9
Following the establishment of Section 13(b), the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (SOX) was passed to provide additional assurance to
investors in the securities market. 10 SOX commissioned rules to prohibit
officers, and their agents, of public companies from manipulating or
coercing auditors of financial statements in order to cause material
misstatements. 11 In furtherance of the SOX requirements, the SEC
enacted Rule 13b2-2 to clarify and strengthen the requirements of
Section 13(b). 12
Currently, there is a circuit split concerning whether scienter is
requisite to finding liability under Rule 13b2-2. “Scienter” is the “mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” 13 Only four
federal circuits have ruled on this issue, and the majority of ruling
appellate courts currently hold that there is not a scienter requirement in
Rule 13b2-2. 14 This holding has been established by the Second Circuit
in SEC v. McNulty, the Seventh Circuit in McConville v. SEC, and the
Eighth Circuit in SEC v. Das. 15 Additionally, the courts find that the
SEC upholds this view as well. 16
The Ninth Circuit initially followed suit and supported the view
held by the majority of the appellate courts. 17 However, the Ninth

8. See 15 U.S.C.S. Section 78m (focusing on Section 13(b)(2)).
9. See generally id.
10. See generally SEC Release No. 34-47890 Final Rule (stating Section 303(a) of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires rules and regulations to be enacted in the public interest for
the protection of investors).
11. See id. (discussing the Rule’s purpose of avoiding improper influence on the conduct of
audits as commissioned by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
12. See generally 17 C.F.R. 240.13b2-2 (providing the language of Rule 13b2-2 forbidding
the manipulation or misleading of auditors in the review of a public company’s financial
statements).
13. SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011), quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S.185, 193 (1976) (defining “scienter”).
14. See generally SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732 (2d. Cir. 1997); McConville v. SEC, 465
F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2006); SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2013).
15. See McNulty, 137 F.3d 732; McConville, 465 F.3d 780; Das, 723 F.3d 943.
16. McNulty, 137 F.3d at 741 (stating Section 13(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act
“contains no words indicating that Congress intended to impose a scienter requirement”).
17. Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722, 738 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that Section 13(b)(2) was
violated because the company failed to keep books and accounts that fairly represented the
transaction, not referring to any knowledge or scienter requirement).
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Circuit has since changed its view. 18 In 2011, the Ninth Circuit in SEC v.
Todd held that there is a stricter standard for imposing liability under
Rule 13b2-2. 19 This standard is the scienter requirement, which requires
the individual to knowingly make misrepresentations to an external
financial statement auditor. 20 In Todd, the court used the holding in
United States v. Goyal to provide reasoning for its scienter
requirement. 21 The crux of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is that to not
impose a scienter requirement would be to open liability on a wider class
of individuals than intended by Congress in the enactment of the rule. 22
With correct intentions, the Ninth Circuit successfully blurred the
lines between “scienter” and “knowledge” when determining whether
there is a scienter requirement to find liability under Rule 13b2-2. The
court used a mixture of the words “scienter” and “knowledge” and made
the requirements to be one and the same; but they are not.23 It is
important to clarify that Rule 13b2-2 does not explicitly state a scienter
requirement to find liability, but should require the individual to have
knowledge of the misrepresentation. The policy argument of the Ninth
Circuit in Todd and Goyal should not be ignored, but it also should not
be used to create a requisite mental component to the rule that Congress
did not intend.
In Part II, this Comment will discuss the background behind
Section 13(b) and Rule 13b2-2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
as well as the intentions of Congress in enacting them. This Comment
will then examine the circuit split on the scienter requirement in Rule
13b2-2. Part III will examine and differentiate the view of the majority
of the appellate court circuits with the view of the Ninth Circuit that
there is a scienter requirement and its reliance on the Goyal decision.
Finally, Part IV will analyze a compromise between the majority
and minority views of the appellate court circuits in establishing the
difference between scienter and knowledge. As alluded to in the Ninth
Circuit opinion, Rule 13b2-2 should have a knowledge requirement, but
18. See generally Todd, 642 F.3d 1207.
19. Id. at 1219 (stating that the district court correctly applied a “knowingly” standard to
Rule 13b2-2).
20. See id., acknowledging United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 916 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that to be liable under Rule 13b2-2 one is required to “knowingly” make incorrect
statements).
21. See id., using Goyal, 629 F.3d at 916 (reasoning that policy concerns require the
establishment of a scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2).
22. See id. at 1219-20 (stating that the court could not loosen the standard set by the statute as
it would result in inflicting liability on a broader breadth of conduct than originally intended by
Congress).
23. See id. generally.
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this requirement should be separate and distinct from a scienter
requirement.
II. THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL NEED TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC IN THE
SOPHISTICATED WORLD OF INVESTMENTS
To understand the nuances of the federal appellate court circuit split
regarding whether scienter is required to be proven to find liability under
Rule 13b2-2, it is important to begin with a discussion of the background
leading to the enactment of Section 13(b) and its associated rule, Rule
13b2-2. Subpart II.A of this Comment will begin the discussion with the
history of corruption and lack of confidence in the financial markets that
resulted in the passing of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
which established Section 13(b) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and speaks to the intentions of Congress.
Subpart II.B will further develop the insight into Section 13(b) and
Rule 13b2-2 with an examination of the language of the legislation.
Finally, Subpart II.C of the Comment will reason for the analytical view
of the requisite mental state required to find civil liability under Rule
13b2-2.
A.

The Government Has Promulgated Legislation in Hopes of
Enhancing the Integrity of Corporate Executives as Well as the
Quality of Financial Reporting

The SEC evolved because of the international interest in investment
in American corporations. Initiated through the passing of the Securities
Act of 1933 by Congress, the SEC was designed and implemented in
1934 to facilitate, as an administrative agency, an increase in investor
confidence in American markets.24 In order to do so, the Securities Act
called for corporations to provide more reliable information and the
corporate executives to act more honestly. 25 Today, the SEC describes
its mission as “[protecting] investors, [maintaining] fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and [facilitating] capital formation.”26
The SEC has five main responsibilities. 27 It is foremost responsible
for interpreting and enforcing the securities laws established by the

24. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 1.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. (explaining the organization of the SEC).
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federal government. 28 Additionally, it is given authority to issue rules as
well as amend previously enacted securities rules and regulations. 29 The
SEC is responsible for overseeing both the review of securities firms and
investment corporations as well as the “private regulatory organizations
in the securities, accounting, and auditing fields.” 30 Finally, the SEC
coordinates federal securities regulation and enforcement with the
federal and state authorities. 31
Ultimately, the SEC seeks to provide investors crucial access to
basic information about investments that is both useful and correct. 32
Through its enforcement and legislative authorities, the SEC requires
public companies to disclose specified financial and non-financial
information to the public through mandatory filings. 33 Additionally, as
the administrative agency in charge of the regulation of federal security
laws, the SEC, in conjunction with the federal authorities, brings civil
and criminal actions against individuals who do not follow the rules and
regulations set forth in the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and SOX. 34
In the hopes of furthering the enhancement of investor confidence,
the FCPA was established in 1977 as part of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. 35 The FCPA sought to fight the bribery of foreign officials in
business transactions. 36 Section 13(b) was enacted as a part of the FCPA
and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 37 Section 13(b) establishes
requirements for the financial records, internal controls, and accounting
of public companies. 38 Section 13(b) establishes these standards to
uphold stricter requirements for the financial records of public
companies, so that investors and the SEC can more easily detect
misrepresentations and fraudulent activities as well as deter public
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. (noting the laws that involve the securities industry are the Securities Act of 1933,
Securities Act of 1934, Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, and Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act).
35. See generally Pub. L. No. 95-213, Sections 101-204, supra note 6; see also Pub. L. No.
95-213, Sections 101-204, (91. Stat. 1494) (codified as 15 U.S.C. Sections 78dd-1 to -3) (enhancing
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act with additional provisions in reaction to extensive bribery of
foreign officials).
36. Pub. L. No. 95-213, Sections 101-204, supra note 6.
37. See id.
38. See generally 15 U.S.C.S. Section 78m (focusing on Section 13(b)(2)).
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companies from acting mischievously in the first place. 39
After the enactment of Section 13(b), SOX was passed in 2002.40
SOX’s mission was to provide additional reassurance to investors in the
securities markets. 41 Specifically, SOX focused on the financial reports
of public companies. 42 SOX established mandatory guidelines that
prohibit executives of public companies, and their agents, from taking
action to manipulate or coerce auditors of financial statements in order
to cause material financial misstatements. 43 Because of SOX, the SEC
enacted Rule 13b2-2 to further clarify and strengthen the requirements
set forth in Section 13(b). 44
B.

The Statutory Language of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section
13(b) and Rule 13b2-2 is the Source of the Confusion

The statutory language of both Section 13(b) and associated Rule
13b2-2 helps to provide some insight into the meaning of the regulation
as well as the intention of Congress in enacting the regulations.
However, as seen below, the language of both the regulation and rule
does not provide a bright-line standard. This means that some
interpretation must be applied to both the regulation and rule. This
ambiguity is what has caused discrepancies among the federal circuits
regarding the meaning of and requirements established by Rule 13b2-2.
The following is the statutory language of Section 13(b):
“ . . . (A) Make and keep books, records, and accounts, which in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; (B) Devise and maintain a system of
internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances
that – (i) Transactions are executed accordance with management’s
general or specific authorization; (ii) Transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and to maintain accountability for assets; (iii)
Access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s
general or specific authorization; and (iv) The recorded accountability
for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals
and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences; and (C)

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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Notwithstanding any other provision of law, pay the allocable share of
such issuer of a reasonable annual accounting support fee or fees . . .
“ 45

The following is the statutory language of Rule 13b2-2:
Representations and conduct in connection with the preparation of required reports and documents. (a) No director or officer of an issuer
shall, directly or indirectly; (1) Make or cause to be made materially
false or misleading statement to an accountant in connection with; or
(2) Omit to state, or cause another person to omit to state, any material
fact necessary in order to make statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading,
to an accountant in connection with: (i) An audit, review or examination of the financial statements of the issuer required to be made pursuant to this subpart; or (ii) The preparation or filing of any document
or report required to be filed with Commission pursuant to this subpart
or otherwise. (b)(1) No officer or director of an issuer or any other person acting under the direction thereof, shall directly or indirectly take
any action to coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently influence
any independent public or certified public accountant engaged in the
performance of an audit or review of the financial statements of that issuer that are required to be filed with the Commission pursuant to this
subpart or otherwise if that person knew or should have known that
such action, if successful, could result in rendering the issuer’s financial statements materially misleading. 46

C.

The SEC Provides Interpretation Regarding the Purpose of Rule
13b2-2

When Rule 13b2-2 was adopted in response to SOX, the SEC
recognized the necessity for clarification. Effective June 2003, the SEC
provided its interpretation (SEC Release) of Rule 13b2-2 and its material
clauses. 47 In their summary, the SEC stated that the rule applied to
individuals who “knew or should have known that [their] action, if
successful, could result in rendering the financial statements materially
misleading.” 48
The SEC provided further clarification for the phrase “take any
action to coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently influence.” 49 The
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

15 U.S.C. Section 78(m)(b)(2)(A)-(C).
17 C.F.R. 240.13b2-2 (emphasis added).
See SEC Release No. 34-47890 Final Rule.
See generally id. (describing violative conduct).
See id., quoting 17 C.F.R. 240.13b2-2.
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SEC first states that the word fraudulently only modified influence and
not “coerce,” “manipulate,” or “mislead.” 50 In its discussion, the SEC
Release states that some commenters suggested that the word “mislead”
should be modified by intent and others suggested that simply any effort
to purposefully influence an auditor or alter a disclosure should be in
violation. 51 Additionally, the SEC Release states that the words “coerce”
and “manipulate” suggest actions such as “pressure, threats, trickery,
intimidation, or some other form of purposeful action.” 52
The SEC also provided examples of conduct that would constitute
improper influence on an auditor and a violation of Rule 13b2-2. 53 These
actions include blackmail, threatening physical violence, and stating the
intent to cancel an engagement. 54 Additional actions listed were
providing incorrect information and bribes. 55 Although not inclusive, the
list provided in the SEC Release is preempted by a statement that any
action that violates the rule must be done with knowledge or a reason to
know that it would improperly influence an auditor. 56
Although it seems the SEC Release provides helpful explanation as
to what conduct would violate Rule 13b2-2, the SEC Release instead
muddles any clarification as to an answer on the topic of a scienter
requirement. While the Release discusses the phrase “coerce,
manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently influence,” the Supreme Court has
only defined “manipulation” and “fraud” as requiring scienter. 57 The
argument is open as to whether “coercion” and “misleading” require
scienter. 58 Additional confusion is added when considering the
“knowledge” or “reason to know” modifications prevalent throughout
the SEC Release, as knowledge and scienter do not share a legal
meaning. 59 The federal appellate courts have since attempted to answer
the question of whether scienter is a requisite mental state required in
Rule 13b2-2.

50. See id.
51. See id. (responding to the proposing release).
52. See id. (providing clarification to the language of the rule).
53. See id.
54. See id. (explaining examples the Commission believes would improperly influence
auditors).
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Paul B. Uhlenhop, A Trap for the Unwary Attorney, SEC Rule 13b2-2: Improper
Influence on Conduct of Audits,15 SEC. NWS. 1 (Fall 2004).
58. Id.
59. See id. (recognizing that “[t]he lack of clarity by the SEC in the Release is
troublesome.”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 6

584

D.

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:575

There is a Split Among the Federal Appellate Circuits Regarding a
Scienter Requirement in Rule 13b2-2

Currently, the federal circuit courts are split concerning whether
scienter must be proven in order to find civil liability under Rule 13b22. 60 Of the four federal circuit courts ruling on this issue, the majority
currently hold that there is no scienter requirement to find civil liability
under Rule 13b2-2. 61 This holding has been established by the Second
Circuit in McNulty, the Seventh Circuit in McConville, and the Eighth
Circuit in Das. 62 The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits rely on the
plain language of Rule 13b2-2 as well as agency interpretations of Rule
13b2-2 from the SEC. 63
The Ninth Circuit initially followed suit and supported the view
held by the majority of the appellate courts. 64 However, in 2011, the
Ninth Circuit changed its stance in Todd and held that there is a stricter
standard for imposing liability under Rule 13b2-2. 65 This standard was
described as a “knowingly” requirement, which requires the individual
to knowingly make misrepresentations to an external financial statement
auditor. 66 In Todd, the court used the holding in Goyal to provide
reasoning for this requisite mental state required to find liability under
Rule 13b2-2. 67 The main argument provided by the Ninth Circuit is that
to not impose a knowledge requirement would be to open liability to a
wider class of individuals than intended by Congress in the enactment of
the rule. 68
60. See generally SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732 (2d. Cir. 1997); McConville v. SEC, 465
F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2006); SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2013); SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207
(9th Cir. 2011).
61. See generally McNulty, 137 F.3d 732; McConville, 465 F.3d 780; Das, 723 F.3d 943.
62. See McNulty, 137 F.3d 732; McConville, 465 F.3d 780; Das, 723 F.3d 943.
63. McNulty, 137 F.3d at 741 (stating that Section 13(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange
Act “contains no words indicating that Congress intended to impose a scienter requirement”); see
also McConville, 465 F.3d at 789; Das, 723 F.3d at 954.
64. Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722, 737 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that Section 13(b)(2) was
violated because the company failed to keep books and accounts that fairly represented the
transaction, not referring to any knowledge or scienter requirement).
65. Todd, 642 F.3d at 1219 (stating that the district court correctly applied a “knowingly”
standard to Rule 13b2-2).
66. See id., acknowledging United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 916 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that to be liable under Rule 13b2-2, one is required to “knowingly” make incorrect
statements).
67. See id., using Goyal, 629 F.3d at 916 (reasoning that policy concerns require the
establishment of a scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2).
68. See id. at 1219-20 (stating that the court could not loosen the standard set by the statute as
it would result in inflicting liability on a broader breadth of conduct than originally intended by
Congress).
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III. IS THERE A SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN RULE 13B2-2?
Subpart III.A of this comment discusses the opinion held by the
majority of ruling circuit courts. The Second Circuit in McNulty,
Seventh Circuit in McConville, and Eighth Circuit in Das all support the
view that no requisite mental component is required to violate Rule
13b2-2. 69 These circuits defer to the evidence of congressional intent and
statements of the SEC in holding that there is no scienter requirement in
Rule13b2-2. 70 Subpart III.B then contrasts the appellate court’s majority
opinion with that of the Ninth Circuit. In SEC v. Todd, the Ninth Circuit
overruled their opinion in Ponce v. SEC and held, through the adoption
of reasoning from Goyal, that there is a scienter requirement to violate
Rule 13b2-2. 71 The Ninth Circuit supports their decision with the policy
rationale of limiting the scope of the rule. 72
A.

The Majority of Appellate Court Circuits Hold that There is no
Scienter Requirement in Rule 13b2-2

The most recent discussion of the scienter requirement in Rule
13b2-2 began in 1997 with the McNulty case. 73 Several corporations
owned and controlled by Robert McNulty raised $78 million through
security offerings. 74 A portion of this money was redirected to McNulty
and other companies controlled by him. 75 During this time, John
Shanklin was both an officer and director of two McNulty companies
and responsible for their financial records and governmental filings. 76
The complaint alleged that the diversion of this money was not
accurately disclosed in the company’s financial records and SEC
filings. 77 In fact, the SEC asserted that Shanklin, in his employment
69. See generally SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732 (2d. Cir. 1997); McConville v. SEC, 465
F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2006); SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2013).
70. See generally McNulty, 137 F.3d 732; McConville, 465 F.3d 780; Das, 723 F.3d 943.
71. See generally Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722, 737 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Todd, 642 F.3d
at 1219, acknowledging Goyal, 629 F.3d at 916 n.6 (holding that to be liable under Rule 13b2-2,
one is required to “knowingly” make incorrect statements).
72. Todd, 642 F.3d at 1219, using Goyal, 629 F.3d at 916 (reasoning that policy concerns
require the establishment of a scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2).
73. See generally McNulty, 137 F.3d 732 (hearing a case discussing the scienter requirement
in Rule 13b2-2 in 1997 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
74. See id. at 734 (discussing the offerings provided through private and public channels).
75. See id.
76. Id. (stating that Shanklin was the vice president, chief executive officer, and operating
officer of Auto Giant, Inc. and president, chief executive officer, operating officer, and
administrative officer of Auto Depot, Inc.).
77. Id. (alleging that the company’s books “misrepresented or falsely concealed material
transactions”).
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capacity, “knew, or recklessly failed to know” that the financial
statements either misrepresented or masked material transactions. 78 If
proven accurate, these allegations would violate Rule 13b2-2. 79
In their analysis, the Second Circuit stated that a lack of scienter
could not act as a defense against any claims under Section 13 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 80 The court reasoned that this holding
was consistent with previous precedent of the Second Circuit as well as
the SEC’s interpretive regulations. 81 Because of the absence of any clear
intent by Congress establishing a scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2,
the court recognized that the SEC’s interpretive regulations should be
entitled to deference. 82 Additionally, the court believed that the absence
of a scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2 was intended because a
“knowing requirement” was only first mentioned in 1988 when
Congress amended the rule in order to allow for criminal liability. 83
In support of the Second Circuit’s holding in McNulty, the Seventh
Circuit followed suit and held that a civil violation of Rule 13b2-2 does
not require scienter. 84 In this instance, Akorn Incorporated (Akorn) was
a pharmaceutical manufacturing company that began using a new
accounts receivable software program. 85 Instead of integrating the old
software with the new, Akorn ran the program separately, which caused
issues in determining the amount of the corporation’s accounts
receivables. 86 This challenge was voiced to the board of directors by
Akorn’s auditor, Deloitte and Touche, LLP; however, Rita McConville,

78. See id. (relying on Shanklin’s responsibility for the internal financial records and SEC
filings).
79. Id. (claiming violation of Sections 10(b), 13(a), and 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934).
80. Id. at 740 (supporting the district court’s ruling that the lack of a requisite mental
requirement is not a defense to a Section 13(b) claim).
81. Id. at 740-41, mentioning SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 200 (2d. Cir. 1972) (upholding
Section 13(b) liability without reference to scienter).
82. Id. at 741 (referencing that the rule “contains no words indicating that Congress intended
to impose a ‘scienter’ requirement”); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (requiring deference to an administrative agency’s
interpretation); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417-18 (1945) (requiring
deference to an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation).
83. Pub. L. No. 100-418, Section 5002, 102 Stat. 1415, (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. Section
78m(b) (1994).
84. See generally McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2006) (hearing a case regarding
the scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2 in 2006 by the Seventh Circuit).
85. Id. at 783 (stating that in 2000 Akorn initiated its use of the new J.D. Edwards software,
but did not transfer the previously tacked accounts from the old Macola software).
86. See id. (stating that the auditor identified a “misapplication of credits and payments to
customers’ accounts, and failure to collect outstanding balances effectively and efficiently”).
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Akorn’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO), downplayed it. 87
The un-integrated software packages resulted in a major
discrepancy with Akorn’s largest customer, Cardinal Health. 88 At the
end of 2000, Cardinal Health believed that they had a credit balance of
$800,000 with Akorn, while Akorn believed that Cardinal Health owed
them $4 million. 89 With the knowledge of such an inconsistency, Akorn
did not change their financial records and made a press release that they
had made $2 million in profit for the first quarter of 2001. 90
By April of 2001, Akorn and Cardinal Health settled on the amount
of the accounts receivable, which resulted in Akorn increasing its
allowance for doubtful accounts by $7.5 million in its Form 10-Q. 91 As a
result, the SEC charged McConville, because of her responsibility as
CFO in filling Akorn’s financial documents, with violating SEC Rules
10b-5, 13b2-1, and 13b2-2. 92
In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit applied the same logic as the
Second Circuit in holding that there is no scienter requirement in Rule
13b2-2. 93 The court stated that as long as it is supported by evidence, the
SEC should be afforded deference in regards to interpreting the rules of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 94 The court should not only
give deference to the Commission, but also uphold the Commission’s
interpretation unless there is “clear congressional intent” in opposition.95
Further, the Seventh Circuit stated that in the absence of clear
congressional intent, the regulation’s interpretation should be upheld
87. See id. (stating that Deloitte & Touche, LLP sent a letter warning the board of the
anticipated issues in the financial statements); see also id. (stating that McConville drafted a report
declaring that an effort to fix the issue was already underway and they planned to reconcile all the
accounts completely by August 2000).
88. See id. (noting that because of the concerns of the auditors voiced to the board of
directors and the un-integrated accounting systems, Akorn’s financial department was already in a
frenzy when the billing discrepancy between Akorn and Cardinal Health arose).
89. See id. (explaining that the difference in the two amounts was almost $5 million and a
result of Cardinal Health’s accounts receivable invoices going back to 1999, which is when the old
software system of Macola was used).
90. See id. at 784 (explaining that McConville claimed the press release to be accurate,
despite the dispute, and assured that there was no material money owed from wholesalers past due
because the balances were offset by credits).
91. See id. at 785-86 (stating that the Form 10-K/A acknowledged that the $7.5 million
increase in allowance for doubtful accounts should have been recorded in the 10-Q for the fourth
quarter of 2000, not 2001, and that once the financial statements were corrected, the $2 million
profit announced in the press release turned out to be a $2.4 million loss).
92. Id. at 789.
93. See generally id.
94. See id. at 786 (stating that the court is required to give “highly deferential, conclusive
effect to the Commission’s factual findings” as long as they are supported by recorded evidence).
95. See id., citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
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unless the Commission’s interpretation is “arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.” 96
In 2013, the Eighth Circuit joined the majority of appellate circuit
courts in holding there is no scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2. 97
Vinod Gupta was the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of infoUSA. 98 As
CEO, Gupta frequently traveled by jet, received payments for the
purchase and upkeep of his yacht as well as payments for a variety of
other personal expenditures. 99 However, infoUSA did not sufficiently
disclose the perquisites as well as the related party transactions that
occurred in regards to their CEO. 100
The SEC brought a civil action against the CFOs of infoUSA,
Stormy Dean and Rajnsh Das, for falsifying their financial records,
certifying false reports filed with the SEC, and providing their auditor
with false information under Rule 13b2-2. 101 In its opinion, the court
took notice of the split in holdings between the circuits and stated, “[we]
agree with the analysis of our sister circuits in McConville and
McNulty.” 102 The court began its analysis with the plain language of the
rule and then noted that it believed substantial deference should be
afforded to the SEC’s interpretation of the rule. 103

96. Id., quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984).
97. See generally SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2013) (hearing a case on the scienter
requirement in Rule 13b2-2 in 2013 by the United States of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit).
98. Id. at 946 (stating that Vinod Gupta “lived a life of luxury”).
99. Id. (noting that Gupta received the benefits of supplementary income and benefits
without recognizing the extra income and paying the additional taxes, and that the employees of the
company thought that this was acceptable because Gupta founded the company as well as enhanced
its value).
100. Id. (stating that the SEC did not agree with the views of the infoUSA employees because
the corporation was publicly traded and the supplementary income received by Gupta should have
been disclosed by the corporation).
101. Id. at 946-47 (stating that the SEC brought civil action against Dean and Das for
securities fraud under Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, falsifying records and books
under Exchange Act Section 13(b)(5), misleading auditors under Rule 13b2-1 and Rule 13b2-2,
aiding in filling false filings to the SEC under Rules 12b-30 and 13a-1, and certifying false reports
under Rule 13a-14).
102. Id. at 954 (regarding Rule 13b2-1 specially, but continuing to follow the same logic as
applied by the Second and Seventh Circuits in reasoning that there is no scienter requirement in
Rule 13b2-2).
103. Id. at 954-56 (ultimately declining to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s holding that Rule 13b2-2
requires the SEC to prove that the actor acted knowingly in their falsification).
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The Minority of Appellate Court Circuits Hold that There is a
Scienter Requirement in Rule 13b2-2

In 2003, the Ninth Circuit first considered the issue of a scienter
requirement in Rule 13b2-2 in the case of Ponce v. SEC. 104 Russell
Ponce was a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and American Aircraft
Corporation’s (AAC) independent auditor. 105 Ponce acted as AAC’s
auditor from 1988 to 1991 and had a significant role in AAC’s reporting
and auditing. 106 As their auditor, Ponce assisted in valuing the assets and
expenses of AAC on their financial statements. 107
The SEC brought civil actions against AAC under SEC Sections
13(a) and 13(b)(2) as well as the accompanying rules.108 The SEC
claimed that Ponce “willfully aided, abetted, and caused” AAC in
violating these rules. 109 The violations occurred because of the
overvaluation of the license designs and the “mischaracterization” of
expenses. 110 In holding that AAC and Ponce violated SEC Section 13(b),
the court did not mention any scienter requirement associated with SEC
Section 13(b)(2) or Rule 13b2-2. 111
However, in 2011 the Ninth Circuit changed its stance regarding a
scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2. 112 In Todd, the Ninth Circuit
reversed its holding in Ponce. 113 In Todd, the SEC brought actions

104. See generally Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2003) (hearing a case regarding a
violation of Section 13(b)(2) and Rule 13b-2 in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit).
105. Id. at 725-26.
106. Id. at 726 (stating that the SEC’s assertions against Ponce resulted from Ponce’s actions
regarding his responsibility for and role in AAC’s reporting and auditing).
107. Id. (noting in the SEC allegations that the violations occurred from Ponce’s involvement
with valuing AAC’s licenses and identifying “tooling and prototype expenses as inventory” on the
financial statements of AAC).
108. Id. at 737 (stating that the SEC’s allegations involved Sections 13(a) and 13(b)(2)).
109. Id. (qualifying that the charges included claims against Ponce for “willfully [aiding],
[abetting], and [causing] AAC” to violate Section 13(b)(2)).
110. Id. (noting in the SEC allegations that the violations occurred from Ponce’s involvement
with valuing AAC’s licenses and identifying “tooling and prototype expenses as inventory costs” on
the financial statements of AAC).
111. Id. (concluding that Section 13(b)(2) was violated because AAC did not maintain “books,
records, and accounts that accurately and fairly reflected the transactions and disposition of AAC’s
assets” and not mentioning any requisite mental intent such as scienter in their holding).
112. See generally SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (considering allegations of
violating Rule 13b2-2, among others, by the SEC in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in 2011).
113. See id. at 1219 (stating that a “knowing” standard was properly applied as a requisite
mental state in violating Rule 13b2-2); Compare with Ponce, 345 F.3d at 737 (holding the actor
liable under Section 13(b)(2) without regards to a knowledge or intent).
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against the executives of Gateway Incorporated (Gateway). 114 Named
parties included John Todd and Robert Manza, former Gateway financial
executives, and Jeffrey Weitzen, Gateway’s former President and
CEO. 115 The SEC stated that Gateway misrepresented transactions with
their clients VenServ, AOL, and Lockheed Martin on their financial
statements. 116 Gateway recognized income from a $21 million
incomplete transaction with VenServ, improperly disclosed a one-time
$72 million transaction with AOL, and incorrectly recognized a $47.2
million lease-back transaction with Lockheed Martin as revenue.117
Regarding the above transactions, the SEC alleged that the
executives falsified the corporation’s financial statements in the third
quarter of 2000. 118 The allegations stated that the executives falsified the
records in order to improve their financial position in attempts to hit
financial analysts’ “earnings and revenue expectations.” 119 Todd, Manza,
and Weitzen all made formal representations to Gateway’s auditors,
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), which stated that the financial
statements conformed to the General Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) and assured continued revenue growth. 120 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of California granted Todd,
Manza, and Weitzen’s motion for summary judgment on the Rule 13b2114. See id. at 1212.
115. Id. at 1212-13 (noting that Weitzen was Gateway’s former CEO, Todd was the
company’s former CFO, and Manza was the former controller as well as the company’s highest
ranking CPA).
116. See generally id. at 1213-14 (discussing the disputed transactions with three of
Gateway’s customers, Lockheed Martin, VenServ, and AOL.).
117. See id. (noting the specifics of each disputed transaction. The Lockheed Martin
transaction involved Gateway recording $47.2 million in gross revenue from a sale of assets, not
manufactured or sold by Gateway, to Lockheed Martin, which was in return leased back by
Gateway. Not only did the recognition of income depart GAAP standards, but the recognition of
gross revenue from the sale of fixed assets departed from the policy standards set by Gateway as
well. The VenServ transaction involved Gateway booking revenue of $21 million from an
incomplete transaction. The revenue should not have been recognized because VenServ was not
obligated to pay Gateway until Gateway had referred a certain amount of customers to them. The
AOL transaction involved proper recognition of a one-time transaction between the two parties of
$72 million, but Gateway did not properly disclose the specifics around the transaction allowing the
public to believe the revenue would continue).
118. Id. at 1212 (stating that the SEC brought action against Gateway and its executives
alleging
that
they
“unlawfully misrepresented” the company’s financial position in the third quarter of the year).
119. See id.
120. Id. at 1213 (distinguishing that Todd and Manza signed the management representation
letter sent to PwC for the third quarter of 2000 certifying that the financial statements were fairly
“prepared” and “[conformed] with generally accepted accounting principles [GAAP]) and that Todd
and Weitzen assured analysts during a conference call that Gateway was “experiencing accelerated
revenue growth”).
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2 claims. 121
The District Court stated that its reasoning for granting the
summary judgment motion stemmed from the fact that no evidence was
provided to prove that neither Todd, Manza, nor Weitzen signed the
management representation letter or made the statements regarding
accelerated revenue growth knowing that the corporation had falsified
their financial statements. 122 Although reversing the summary judgment
as granted for the claims against Todd and Manza, the Appellate Court
stated that the District Court correctly applied a “knowingly” standard to
Rule 13b2-2. 123
In its support of the District Court, the Ninth Circuit primarily
relied on support from Goyal. 124 Goyal involved criminal allegations
made by the SEC against the Network Associates, Inc. (NAI) and its
former CFO in using non-GAAP accounting methods to recognize sales
revenue from the corporation’s largest distributor in order to meet the
revenue projections for the quarter. 125 The SEC ultimately accused
Prabhat Goyal with “willfully and knowingly” making
misrepresentations to NAI’s auditor, PwC. 126 The court held that there
was a mandatory “knowingly” requirement to find liability under Rule
13b2-2. 127
Although the Goyal standard was in regards to criminal liability
under Rule 13b2-2, the Ninth Circuit in Todd applied it to civil liability
as well. 128 The court in Todd stated that the District Court properly
imposed a “knowingly” standard because there is a distinct difference

121. Id. at 1212 (stating that the SEC was appealing the district court’s ruling to grant
summary judgment on the part of Todd, Manza, and Weitzen).
122. Id. (noting that the district court found no evidence that Weitzen signed the representation
letter for the auditor’s knowing that Gateway falsified its financial position and stating that the
appellate court was reversing the order granting summary judgment in the matters of Todd and
Manza because there was enough evidence to support the theory that Todd and Manza “at least
recklessly misrepresented revenue related to the Lockheed [and VenServ] transaction[s]”).
123. Id. at 1219 (stating that the district court correctly applied a “knowing” standard to Rule
13b2-2, which the SEC “failed to distinguish from intent to mislead”).
124. See generally id. at 1219-20 (recognizing that Goyal provided the rule for the court to
follow, that “to be liable, one must ‘knowingly” make false statements.’”); See also United States v.
Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 916 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010).
125. Goyal, 629 F.3d at 913 (additionally recognizing that the jury found Goyal guilty of
securities fraud and making false filings with the SEC).
126. Id. at 916, quoting United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004)
(defining “willfully and knowingly” to require that the actions were “voluntarily and knowingly
wrongful”).
127. See id. (stating that the government had to provide evidence that Goyal knew the
statements he made to PwC were false).
128. See generally Todd, 642 F.3d 1207.
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between “knowingly” and “intent to mislead.” 129 The court stated in
dictum that the SEC does not require strict liability but did intend to find
liability under the rule in situations of negligence. 130 The court stated
that the knowledge requirement “requires that [the defendant] ‘was
aware of the falsification and did not falsify through ignorance, mistake,
or accident.’” 131
Additionally, the Todd court focused on the policy reasoning in
Goyal in determining that there is a “knowingly” requirement in Rule
13b2-2. 132 The Ninth Circuit strongly advocated that it could not
interpret the statutory rule to not have a requisite mental state because to
do so would make the scope of liability imposed by the Rule too
broad. 133 Specifically, the court stated that not requiring an actor to
“knowingly” violate Rule 13b2-2 would “impose liability on a broader
range of conduct than Congress intended.” 134
IV. AS APPLIED TO RULE 13B2-2, SCIENTER AND KNOWLEDGE SHOULD
NOT BE ONE AND THE SAME
Subpart IV.A of this comment analyzes the three potential avenues
that courts can take in resolving the question of whether there is a
scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2. Traditionally, the courts could
follow the appellate circuit court’s majority view that there is not a
scienter requirement to finding liability under Rule 13b2-2, or the courts
could follow the current minority view of the appellate circuit courts that
legislators intended there to be a scienter requirement to finding liability
under Rule 13b2-2. However, the appellate circuit courts could also
choose a third option—to set a new standard.
Subpart IV.B of this Comment will discuss a new, third avenue for
the circuits to consider. Currently, when referring to a requisite mental
state in Rule 13b2-2, the courts treat “knowledge” as having the same
meaning as “scienter.” This confusion has not only muddled the
distinction between the two concepts but also helped to cause the
discrepancy in views between the circuits. Not only are the connotations
129. See id. at 1219 (stating that knowledge and an intent to mislead can be distinguished); see
also United States v. Watkins, 278 F.3d 961, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that knowledge about
falsification cannot prove an intent to mislead).
130. Id. (stating that the SEC acknowledges that the rule does not “create a strict liability
regime,” but does seek to provide a standard to punish for negligence).
131. Id., quoting United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009).
132. See generally id. at 1219-20.
133. See generally id.
134. See id. (stating the court could not loosen the standard set by the statute as it would result
in inflicting liability on a broader breadth of conduct than originally intended by Congress).
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of the words separate, but the denotations are as well. It will be
recommended that Rule 13b2-2 should have a knowledge requirement,
but this requirement should be separate and distinct from a scienter
requirement.
A.

There are Three Potential Theories to Follow When Considering
Whether There is a Requisite Mental State in Rule 13b2-2

There are three avenues the appellate circuit courts can take when
deciding the question of whether there is a requisite mental state
required to find liability under Rule 13b2-2. When answering the
question, courts can either stick with the status quo, side with the
unpopular opinion, or analytically look at the totality of the
circumstances and chart their own territory.
First, the circuit could follow the opinion of the majority of ruling
federal court circuits. This opinion is that no requisite mental state needs
to be proven for a court to find liability under Rule 13b2-2. The Second
Circuit in McNulty, Seventh Circuit in McConville, and Eighth Circuit in
Das all support the view that there is no requisite mental component to
violations of Rule 13b2-2. 135 As this first option is the popular view,
there are many strong arguments that support adopting this interpretation
of Rule 13b2-2.
Choosing to not require a requisite mental state to find liability
under Rule 13b2-2 is by far the “easier” opinion. A major compelling
reason to support not recognizing a requisite mental state comes from
the plain language of the rule. Rule 13b2-2 states that one must not
“make or cause to be made” or “omit to state or cause another person to
omit to state.” 136 In reference to these actions the rule does not mention
or even allude to an individual “making” or “omitting” with knowledge
or intent to deceive. Because rules are meant to provide courts with the
necessary information to allow them to determine whether an
individual’s actions violate the law, it can be argued that Congress did
not intend for the courts to require one to act either knowingly or with
intent. This reading of the plain language of the rule is supported by the
legislative interpretation of the rule.
As interpreted by the majority of ruling appellate circuit courts, the
SEC’s interpretation of Rule 13b2-2 does not read a scienter requirement
as a requisite mental state in violating Rule 13b2-2. Because Rule 13b2135. See generally SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732 (2d. Cir. 1997); McConville v. SEC, 465
F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2006); SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2013).
136. 17 C.F.R. 240.13b2-2, supra note 12.
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2 enumerates the four actions of coercing, manipulating, misleading, and
fraudulently influencing, and the Supreme Court has found only two of
them to require scienter, the courts believe that scienter is not required in
order to find liability under the rule. Additionally, in the SEC Release,
scienter was not mentioned. 137
Second, the appellate circuit courts could follow the opinion held
by the minority of ruling federal appellate circuit courts. This opinion
requires that the mental requisite state of scienter be proven for a court
to find liability under Rule 13b2-2. The Ninth Circuit described this
standard as requiring an individual to knowingly make
misrepresentations to an external financial statement auditor. 138
However, only the Ninth Circuit in Todd supports the reading of a
scienter requirement into Rule 13b2-2. Because neither the majority of
federal circuits, nor the government, currently support a requisite mental
state in order to find liability under Rule 13b2-2, the reasons to support
this reading must be compelling.
The compelling arguments supporting the reading of a scienter
requirement into Rule 13b2-2 are the plain language of the rule and
policy. Although Rule 13b2-2 does not mention or allude to any required
knowledge or intent regarding the “making” or “omitting” of materially
false statements to auditors, the rule does in fact have language
implicating a requisite mental state. Rule 13b2-2 states that no person
should “coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently influence” an
auditor though their actions. 139
Intent is implied in the general connotation associated with words
such as “coerce” and “manipulate.” One cannot accidently coerce or
manipulate another. One must have knowledge of their actions and
intend to change or influence the actions of another to have coerced,
manipulated, or misled another. Therefore, Congress must have intended
for the courts to recognize that in order to violate Rule 13b2-2 there
must be some sort of requisite mental state required.
Additionally, policy supports the reading of scienter into Rule
13b2-2. When Rule 13b2-2 was enacted in response to SOX, the
legislation was intended to help enhance investor confidence as well as
curb corporate corruption. In pursuit of this goal, the SEC intended to
punish those who knowingly or intentionally acted with the result of a
137. See SEC Release No. 34-47890 Final Rule, supra note 10.
138. Todd, 642 F.3d at 1219, acknowledging United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 916 n.6
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that to be liable under Rule 13b2-2, one is required to “knowingly” make
incorrect statements).
139. 17 C.F.R. 240.13b2-2, supra note 12.
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detriment to investor confidence. The SEC never intended the rule to
find individuals liable who acted mistakenly. Therefore, the SEC must
have intended for some sort of requisite mental state to be read into Rule
13b2-2 to find liability.
A scienter requirement would set a high standard for this requisite
mental state. Such a requirement is necessary to avoid finding liable a
wider class of individuals than intended by the SEC in the enactment of
the rule. As discussed in the SEC Release, the SEC did not intend to
require strict liability regarding the rule, but it did intend to find liability
in situations where the conduct was at least “knowingly”. A scienter
requirement would not only eliminate any strict liability, but further
eliminate the chance of finding liability of a wider group of individuals
than originally intended by the SEC.
However, both the majority and minority opinions of the ruling
federal circuits come with drawbacks. Although the popular opinion, not
reading a requisite mental state into Rule 13b2-2 to find liability has
some strong disadvantages. The interpretation in the SEC Release states
that the Commission did not intend strict liability under the rule, as it
states an actor must knowingly or have reason to know that his actions
would improperly influence an auditor. Therefore, some requisite mental
state must be proven to find liability under Rule 13b2-2. Additionally,
policy dictates that liability should be limited to the category of actors
intended by the SEC. To accomplish this goal some requisite mental
state must be required.
Reading a scienter requirement into Rule 13b2-2 poses its own
difficulties. Even though policy dictates limiting the net of liability
resulting from the rule, it also dictates promoting the good of the whole.
As the rule was implemented to deter corporate corruption and enhance
investor confidence, it will not be able to accomplish these goals if
liability under the rule is severely limited by the high standard of a
scienter requirement.
Although the language of Rule 13b2-2 does not produce strict
liability, the SEC did not intend the high standard of scienter to be read
into the rule. In its interpretation, the SEC never mentioned a scienter
standard but did in fact discuss that the actor must act with knowledge or
must have reason to know their action would improperly influence the
auditor. Because of the difference in legal meaning between scienter and
knowledge, and because the interpretation used only the word
knowledge, the SEC must not have intended the courts to read a
requisite mental state as extreme as a scienter requirement into Rule
13b2-2.
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Therefore, the appellate circuit courts could decide to follow neither
the majority nor minority of federal circuit courts. The circuits could
decide to establish their own standard or to clarify and expand the
opinions of either the majority or minority of circuits. Because there are
strong arguments against both the opinions of the majority and minority
of federal circuit courts, the courts should choose this third avenue when
deciding the question of whether a scienter requirement should be read
into Rule 13b2-2.
B.

A Knowledge Requirement, Separate and Distinct from Scienter,
Should be the Requisite Mental State Read into Rule 13b2-2

The federal circuit courts should decide to follow neither the
majority nor minority federal court opinions. Because of the general
description of the requisite mental state required in Rule 13b2-2 as
scienter, the intentions of Congress and the SEC have been clouded.
This has caused not only the circuit split regarding a scienter
requirement in Rule 13b2-2, but also confusion as to the rule’s separate
implications in civil and criminal cases. In the case of civil liability
under Rule 13b2-2, a scienter requirement should be differentiated from
a knowledge requirement.
1. Both the Legal Definition of Knowledge as well as the Plain
Meaning of the Words Incorporated Within Help to Explain
how a Knowledge Standard Would be Implemented in Rule
13b2-2
In regard to Rule 13b2-2, reading knowledge, and not scienter, as
the requisite mental state to establish liability would clarify the
implications and applicability of the rule in many ways. Concerning its
application in Rule 13b2-2, the courts recognize knowledge to “[require]
that [the defendant] was aware of the falsification and did not falsify
through ignorance, mistake, or accident.” 140 The Supreme Court has
recognized “scienter” to be the “mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” 141
To clarify and illuminate the differences between scienter and
knowledge, their legal definitions can further be explained. As
individuals violating the rule would more than likely be corporate
140. Goyal, 629 F.3d at 916, quoting United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir.
2009) (defining knowledge).
141. Todd, 642 F.3d at 1215, quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)
(defining scienter).
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employees and officials without a legal background, the legal definitions
of knowledge and scienter would best be explained by using the
plain/dictionary meaning of the words incorporated. This not only
provides insight into the meaning of the knowledge standard but also
additional assistance in the future implementation of the knowledge
standard in Rule 13b2-2.
As previously stated, courts recognize knowledge to “[require] that
[the defendant] was aware of the falsification and did not falsify through
ignorance, mistake, or accident.” 142 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary
provides additional meaning to the legal definition of the word
knowledge that helps to provide support to a knowledge standard in Rule
13b2-2. Awareness is having or showing realization, perception, or
knowledge of a fact or situation. 143 Ignorance is having a lack of
understanding, knowledge, or education. 144 To mistake is to make a
wrong judgment of the character or ability of something. 145 Acting by
accident is with the lack of intention or necessity. 146
As noted, the Supreme Court has recognized “scienter” to be “the
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” 147
However, four additional plain meanings help to define the words
incorporated within the legal meaning of scienter. An action is intended
when it is a clearly formulated or planned event.148 To deceive is to
make [someone] believe something that is not true. 149 To manipulate is
to use or change [numbers, information, etc.] in a skillful way or for a
particular purpose. 150 To defraud is to trick or cheat someone or
something in order to get money or to use fraud in order to get money
from a person, an organization, etc. 151 Finally, to commit fraud is to use
142. Goyal, 629 F.3d at 916, quoting Reyes, 577 F.3d at 1081 (defining knowledge).
143. See generally Aware, Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/aware (2015) (paraphrasing the definition of “aware”).
144. See generally Ignorance, Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ignorance (2015) (paraphrasing the definition of “ignorance”).
145. See generally Mistake, Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/mistake (2015) (paraphrasing the definition of mistake).
146. See generally Accident, Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/accident (2015) (paraphrasing the definition of “accident”).
147. SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011), quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (defining “scienter”).
148. See generally Active, Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/action (2015) (paraphrasing the definition of “action”).
149. See generally Deceive, Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/deceive (2015) (paraphrasing the definition of “deceive”).
150. See generally Manipulate, Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/manipulate (2015) (paraphrasing the definition of “manipulate”).
151. See generally Defraud, Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
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deceitful methods to procure something of worth from another. 152
As shown through the clarification of the definitions of knowledge
and scienter, applying the standard of knowledge to Rule 13b2-2 would
increase the benchmark to impose liability above no requisite mental
state but still below the high standard of scienter. To violate Rule 13b22, individuals must be cognitively conscious that their actions could
wrongly influence an auditor’s actions and/or decisions but do not have
to have the devious intentions to influence the auditor. This would
eliminate any liability for those who simply misunderstood, misspoke, or
non-negligently made a mistake. Additionally, although the rule would
not require individuals to intentionally act, it would still apply to those
who did.
2. Implementing a Knowledge Standard in Rule 13b2-2 is
Supported by the Language of the Rule, the SEC’s
Interpretation of the Rule, and Policy
Why implement a knowledge standard when considering liability
under Rule 13b2-2? A knowledge standard should be read into Rule
13b2-2 for many reasons. First, the policy argument of limiting the
liability imposed by rules to that intended by the rule maker requires that
Rule 13b2-2 not impose strict liability on actors. Second, the language of
Rule 13b2-2 describes the actions that would violate the rule as those
that require at least a minimum level of a requisite mental state. Third,
the interpretation of Rule 13b2-2 in the SEC Release explicitly explains
that for actions to be considered within the jurisdiction of the rule the
actor must have knowledge or reason to know that their actions could
improperly influence an auditor.
First, policy dictates that the Commission’s intentions in enacting
Rule 13b2-2 to not establish strict liability be upheld. This requires that a
requisite mental state be required to find liability under Rule 13b2-2. For
innocent conduct such as mistakes and misunderstandings to not be
considered conduct violative of Rule 13b2-2, a requisite mental standard
must be required. This will help limit the kinds of conduct found
violative, therefore limiting the scope of liability of Rule 13b2-2.
The Ninth Circuit focused heavily on a policy argument. The court
focused on limiting the span of liability of Rule 13b2-2 by adding a
knowledge requirement to the rule. Policy dictates that Rule 13b2-2
webster.com/dictionary/defraud (2015) (paraphrasing the definition of “defraud”).
152. See generally Fraud, Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/fraud (2015) (paraphrasing the definition of “fraud”).
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cannot be interpreted without a requisite mental state because it would
make Rule 13b2-2 too broad and similar to strict liability, which was not
intended by Congress or the Commission as explained in the SEC
Release. Specifically, the court in Todd stated that by not requiring an
actor to act with knowledge or reason to know that their actions could
improperly influence auditors would “impose liability on a broader
range of conduct than Congress intended.” 153
When Rule 13b2-2 was enacted in response to SOX, the legislation
was intended to help enhance investor confidence as well as curb
corporate corruption. In pursuance of this goal, the SEC intended to
punish those who knowingly or intentionally acted with the result of a
detriment to investor confidence. The SEC never intended the rule to
find individuals liable who acted mistakenly. Therefore, the SEC must
have intended for some sort of requisite mental state to be read into Rule
13b2-2 to find liability.
A requisite mental state is necessary to avoid finding liability on a
wider class of individuals than intended by the SEC in enacting the rule.
However, a scienter requirement would set too high of a standard for this
requisite mental state. A scienter requirement would not only eliminate
any strict liability, but also further require that any conduct be done with
deceitful intent to violate the rule.
A scienter requirement would not only limit the scope of liability
under Rule 13b2-2, but also set an extremely high standard to prove
liability. Such a standard would make it difficult for individuals to be
found liable, therefore ensuring that the conduct Congress intended to
deter and punish is not disciplined. A knowledge standard would provide
a successful compromise by limiting the scope of liability and still allow
the rule to be effective by not establishing such a high standard for
prosecutors to prove liability.
Second, the language of the law requires that at least a knowledge
standard be read into Rule 13b2-2. The majority of ruling federal
appellate courts argue that Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 does not “[contain] words indicating that Congress intended to
impose a scienter requirement.” 154 However, the language in Rule 13b22 was enacted to further clarify and support Section 13(b) and therefore
should be provided equal weight in the argument. Further, the language
153. SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that the court could not loosen
the standard set by the statute, as it would result in inflicting liability on a broader breadth of
conduct than originally intended by Congress).
154. SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 741 (2d. Cir. 1997) (arguing for not reading a scienter
requirement to find liability under Rule 13b2-2).
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of Rule 13b2-2 does in fact contain words that allude to Congress’ intent
to impose at least a minimum requisite standard.
Rule 13b2-2 states that an individual must not “take any action to
coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently influence” auditors.155 For
conduct to be coercive, manipulative, misleading, or fraudulently
influencing it requires a requisite mental state from the actor. An actor
cannot coerce another into acting a certain way unless they have
knowledge that their words or actions will influence the other to respond
in a certain way.
Similarly, to mislead another, an actor must be cognitively aware
that their conduct or words will result in another believing something is
the truth, resulting in conduct desired by the actor. The same type of
knowledge prefaces manipulation and fraudulent influence as well. This
is a result of coercion, manipulation, misleading, and fraudulently
influencing being “active” actions, which require that an actor
knowingly act in a certain way. Therefore, the violative actions require a
requisite mental state.
So, the Commission and Congress must have intended for at least a
knowledge standard to be read into Rule 13b2-2. Without this minimum
standard of a requisite mental state, the conduct described in Rule 13b22 would not occur. Therefore, knowledge is a necessity for Rule 13b2-2
to be violated. Additionally, although the rule does not use the term
knowledge or the phrase that an actor must act knowingly, the SEC’s
interpretation of the rule does.
Finally, the interpretation of Rule 13b2-2 as discussed in the SEC
Release requires that for an actor to violate Rule 13b2-2 the actor must
have knowledge or reason to know that their actions could improperly
influence an auditor. From beginning to end, the SEC Release both
explicitly and implicitly supports the reading of a requisite mental state,
more specifically knowledge, into Rule 13b2-2. This is evidenced
through its enumerated examples and establishment of the Commission’s
use of the phrase knew or had reason to know.
The first page of the SEC Release states that the newly revised rule
was not intended by the Commission to impose a “new scienter
requirement” on Rule 13b2-2. 156 The use of the word “new” connotes
something additional, or different. Therefore, for there to be a “new
scienter requirement” there had to be some “old” scienter requirement,
or at least minimal requisite mental state required of the rule.

155.
156.

17 C.F.R. 240.13b2-2, supra note 12.
SEC Release No. 34-47890 Final Rule, supra note 10
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In the SEC Release, the Commission also stated that the rule
applied to individuals who “knew or should have known that [their]
action, if successful, could result in rendering the financial statements
materially misleading.” 157 The Commission requiring an actor to have
knowledge or a reason to know their actions could have such an effect is
equivalent to a knowledge requirement. This statement by the
Commission explicitly states that they intended a knowledge
requirement to be read into Rule 13b2-2. Further, because the
Commission did not explain that the actor must also have the intent for
their actions to have such an effect, they distinguished any required
requisite mental state from scienter.
The further clarification provided by the Commission for the phrase
“take any action to coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently
influence” indicated additional support for the implementation of a
knowledge standard into Rule 13b2-2. 158 The SEC Release states that the
words “coerce and manipulate” suggests actions such as “pressure,
trickery, intimidation, or some other form of purposeful action.” 159 The
conduct enumerated by the Commission connotes actions, which require
that the actor act knowingly. One cannot pressure, trick, or intimidate
without knowing or having reason to know that they are doing so.
The Commission also provided examples of conduct that could
trigger improper influence on an auditor and therefore a violation of
Rule 13b2-2. These actions include blackmail, threatening physical
violence, claiming the intent to cancel an engagement, providing
incorrect information and bribes. 160 Not only do these actions require
that the actor act with knowledge of the effect that their conduct could
have on an auditor, but the SEC Release also preempted the listed
actions by a statement that they intended violative conduct to be done
with knowledge or a reason to know that it would improperly influence
an auditor.
The reasons for applying a knowledge standard to Rule 13b2-2 are
numerous. The policy argument of limiting the liability imposed by rules
to that intended by the rule maker requires that Rule 13b2-2 does not
impose strict liability on actors. However, the high standard of scienter
would limit the liability too extremely. A knowledge standard would
limit the scope of liability and protect against imposing too high a
requirement for proving liability.
157.
158.
159.
160.
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Not only does policy demand a knowledge standard in Rule 13b2-2,
but the language of Rule 13b2-2 also supports it. Rule 13b2-2 describes
actions that would violate the rule as those that require at least a
minimum level of a requisite mental state. Actions such as coercion,
manipulation, fraudulent influence, and misleading require that an actor
act with knowledge of the repercussion of their actions to violate the
rule. Finally, the interpretation of Rule 13b2-2 in the SEC Release
explicitly explains that for actions to be considered within the
jurisdiction of the rule the actor must have knowledge or reason to know
that their actions could improperly influence an auditor.
Further, the legal definition of knowledge and the plain/dictionary
meaning of the words incorporated will help courts to understand and
implement this standard. As applicable to Rule 13b2-2, for an actor to
have knowledge or reason to know that their conduct could improperly
influence an auditor they must be “aware of the falsification and did not
falsify through ignorance, mistake, or accident.” 161 The plain meanings
within this phrase further help explain the standard of violative conduct
in Rule 13b2-2 to potential violators as well as provide courts with
additional factors to analyze in applying the knowledge standard.
V. CONCLUSION
It is important to find a solution to the current circuit split
concerning whether scienter is requisite to finding liability under Rule
13b2-2 because of the implications the reading of the Rule can have and
has had on the actors in the financial market. The deference given to the
SEC’s interpretation of Rule 13b2-2 in the SEC Release is too strong of
evidence to stray far from the opinion held by the majority of appellate
circuit courts. This majority opinion, supported in McNulty, McConville,
and Das, states that a scienter requirement should not be read into Rule
13b2-2. However, the policy reasoning established in Goyal that
Congress did not intend to establish liability on a wide range of conduct,
which supports the minority opinion of the Ninth Circuit in Todd reading
a scienter requirement into Rule 13b2-2, cannot be ignored.
The SEC did not intend to establish the high standard that scienter
as a requisite mental state requires to prove liability under Rule 13b2-2.
As recognized by the courts in the Ninth Circuit, the SEC did not want
any official who simply made a mistake in their representations to
auditors to be found liable. The Ninth Circuit also recited that to not
161. United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2010), quoting United States v. Reyes, 577
F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009) (defining knowledge).
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impose a requirement of a requisite mental state would be to open
liability to a wider class of individuals than intended by Congress in the
enactment of the rule.
Congress’s intent to limit the range of liability is evidenced in the
SEC Release through its continued effort to explain that an actor must
have knowledge or at least a reason to know that his conduct could
improperly influence auditors. It is also supported through the example
of intentional conduct provided in the SEC Release that the Commission
wanted to specify as actions that would violate the rule. Therefore, a
compromise needs to be made.
Because the issue stems from the courts treating scienter and
knowledge as having the same legal meaning, clearly differentiating the
standards from one another would pave the way for agreement among
the courts. As alluded to in the Todd opinion, Rule 13b2-2 should have a
knowledge requirement, but this requirement should be separate and
distinct from a scienter requirement. This distinction is most evident in
the legal meaning of the terms and the plain/dictionary meaning of the
words incorporated. It is also supported in the SEC Release and the dicta
in all the appellate courts.
Having knowledge or reason to know the actor’s conduct could
improperly influence the auditor, as described in the SEC Release, is
distinct from having the “mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud” that scienter requires. 162 A knowledge
requirement would not only support the SEC’s interpretation of Rule
13b2-2, but also encourage the undertone in the majority of ruling
federal court opinions, which is that the courts realize Rule 13b2-2 does
not provide strict liability but that it does not require scienter either.
Additionally, reading a knowledge requirement into Rule 13b2-2
will support policy by sparing those officials who simply made a
mistake in their representations, calculations, and/or disclosures, while
still allowing for liability to be established on a broader class of
individuals than the stricter standard of liability under a scienter
requirement would.

162. SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011), quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (defining “scienter”).
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